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Abstract
There is an expectation towards public policy 
to ensure efficiency in public procurement (man-
age public spending properly), ensure account-
ability and support the social, environmental and 
other economic and political goals. Increasingly 
complex regulation raises the question of whether 
its complexity helps or rather hinders the efficient 
spending of public money. This paper aims to con-
tribute to the discussion going on about efficiency 
in public procurement. It investigates non-com-
pliance in public procurement with the aim of re-
vealing types of non-compliance and to structure 
knowledge on the effects of the remedy system to 
non-compliance.
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1. Introduction
In the context of public policy, public procurement related research focuses main-
ly on affected groups such as SMEs or on sustainability issues (Preuss, 2011; Flynn 
and Davis, 2016; Testa et al., 2016; Flynn, 2018). Numerous public policy papers also 
highlight the relationship between public procurement and innovation (Rolfstam, 
2009; Vecchiato and Roveda, 2014). In addition to these important topics, efficiency 
of public procurement in the public policy context is less frequently addressed. This 
study aims to contribute to the public policy discussion by highlighting this aspect of 
the public procurement policy making. It will investigate non-compliance in public 
procurement with the aim of revealing types of non-compliance and to structure the 
knowledge on the effects of the remedy system to non-compliance.
Public procurement officials, while accomplishing their jobs to procure goods and 
services that satisfy the needs of their organisations, are bound by laws, procedures 
and regulations. There is an expectation towards them to ensure efficiency (man-
age public spending properly), ensure accountability and support the social, environ-
mental and other economic and political goals. These expectations, in general, are 
common to all procurement systems. However, the effect of the constantly growing 
regulations has led to a debate among scholars and practitioners who were concerned 
with the impact on public procurement performance as they seek to comply with 
rules (Kassel, 2008).
The goal of the paper is to investigate the reasons for and types of non-compli-
ance in public procurement while connecting the realms of public procurement and 
public policy which are rarely addressed together in literature. The structure of the 
paper will be the following: after the literature review we develop four dimensions 
to investigate the reasons for non-compliance in public procurement. Comparing the 
interviews’ results of nine EU countries, our conclusions revealed that a procure-
ment-friendly set of institutions shall be well prepared, have experience, and be reli-
able, efficient, cheap and flexible.
2. Literature review
Research on public procurement was devoted to examining the potential causes 
of non-compliance to ensure that risks were avoided. It was frequently hypothesised 
that the complicated regulations pose high risks of inefficient ways of spending funds 
(these rules increase transaction costs for buyers and suppliers) and they raise risks 
in terms of achieving public goals (Hawkins and Muir, 2014). Gelderman, Ghijsen and 
Brugman (2006) identified four groups of potential reasons for non-compliance. Their 
empirical findings related to an EU (Danish) sample indicated that familiarity in pur-
chasing with the rules and organizational incentives has a positive impact on compli-
ance, while alleged inefficiency of the EU Public Procurement Directives (hereafter 
EU PP Directives, namely Directive 2014/23/EU, Directive 2014/24/EU and Directive 
2014/25/EU), and the expected supplier resistance seem not to influence compliance 
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with the directives. The work of Brammer and Walker (2011) extended this investi-
gation to sustainable procurement. Their results about the main facilitators of and 
barriers to engagement with sustainable procurement in the public sector show that 
if government policy and legislation is supportive of sustainable purchasing, public 
sector organisations are more likely to implement sustainable purchasing. Investi-
gating US practice, Hawkins and Muir (2014) highlighted that effectiveness of pub-
lic procurement depends on mastery of vast knowledge (especially the accumulated 
knowledge of the individual agent), and it also promotes compliance with the laws.
In addition to cost-effectiveness and legal compliance, the need for innovation 
also appears (Heijboer and Telgen, 2002; Brammer and Walker, 2011). Innovation 
(just as in the private business sphere) should be a very important issue in the public 
sector as well, since this would provide opportunities for achieving the most complex 
business results and achieving the most innovative goals and promote the innova-
tiveness of suppliers.
As this brief summary suggests, literature addresses the issue of compliance in 
terms of barriers and facilitators. It has also been addressed which EU PP Directives 
are most sensitive to non-compliance (Gelderman, Ghijsen and Schoonen, 2010). 
However, according to our knowledge, only limited information exists about the ac-
tual characteristics of non-compliance.
The risks of non-compliance in procurement and public procurement greatly differ 
from one another (Karjalainen, Kemppainen and Van Raaij, 2009). As public procure-
ment in the European Union is based on a uniform set of rules, an exceedingly great 
deal of experience has been accumulated about the risks of non-compliance in the 
public procurement market. The difference is largely in the fact that expressly from 
the viewpoint of the public purchaser, the contracting authority needs to comply 
with rules other than the internal ones of a company. The internal rules of a company 
may be exceedingly administrative and lengthy, yet they can be changed and they 
serve first and foremost the interests of the purchaser. In the profit-oriented sphere, 
the purchaser needs to worry about sanctions not in the course of the procurement 
process, but mostly in the course of performance. A purchaser is affected by the risk 
of non-compliance with the corporate internal rules primarily as a person because 
if she/he fails to comply with the corporate internal rules, she/he may be called to 
account. The organisation itself is entitled to interpret internal corporate rules, which 
means that so long as the competition rules of the Civil Code and, of course, compe-
tition law are complied with, the risk of not following the company’s own procedural 
rules poses little threat. Naturally, one of the reasons for this in the profit-oriented 
sphere may be that market actors are not fully informed of the procedure and they 
are unable to enforce their interests the same way as in public procurement, where 
in many cases there is a dedicated forum of legal remedies addressing their problems. 
Of course, economic actors are always restrained knowing that if they harm the en-
tity inviting bids, it will no longer be willing to contract with them later on. This 
restraining force is less enforced in public procurement because if a bidder meets 
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the conditions of the publicly announced procedures, the contracting authority has 
little possibility to blacklist them and not to contract with them as in the non-public 
procurement market. 
Our assumption is that the approach, innovativeness and, accordingly, the ability 
of the purchaser to assume risks is influenced by the extent to which the system of 
legal remedies is prepared to solve the legal problems arising in the course of the pro-
curement procedure. Similarly, if the purchaser is aware, he may be influenced by the 
knowledge that financing legal remedies is expensive, thus few can afford it. Another 
important factor is the length and efficiency of such a legal dispute, because the pur-
chaser may suffer the gravest damage, if she/he cannot continue procurement, she/
he cannot meet the demands because of waiting for the results of the legal remedy 
procedure. There are a number of other factors, which may affect that approach and 
decisions of the public purchaser in the course of the procurement procedure.
The innovativeness of the public purchaser may be manifested in the choice of 
the type of the procedure, in drafting the selection criteria, in delineating the techni-
cal content, in working out the content of the contract and in developing the set of 
contract award criteria. In our case, we would regard it as innovative if the purchaser 
chose the innovation partnership procedure, for instance, where the purchaser and 
his partners engage in innovation jointly and economic actors compete only thereaf-
ter. Similarly, the use of the eco label among the contract award criteria, or taking the 
criteria of environmental protection into account when defining the technical con-
tent, whether in setting the selection and contract award criteria, could be innovative. 
Paying particular attention to social criteria in the course of contract performance 
with a view to preventing child labour being employed by any actor across the supply 
chain could also be innovative.
Our point of departure is the assumption that the legal remedy systems of public 
procurement may impact in many ways whether economic actors make use of their 
rights and whether they initiate legal remedy procedures. In the course of our re-
search, we do not study the reliability and independence of the fora of legal remedy, 
but the implementation of the same EU PP Directive-based regulatory environment 
in nine European Union Member States under study.
3. Methodology
Our goal is to develop a categorization of types of non-compliance, taking into 
account national remedies and the legal environment. Our assumption was that the 
main characteristics of the remedy system influence the approach, innovativeness 
and ability of the purchaser to assume risks. Particular attention is paid to the appli-
cation of green and social considerations in public procurement, which is one of the 
most important proofs of the innovative attitude of public purchasers.
To assess the actual non-compliance problems, we conducted in-depth interviews 
with 9 national experts from the European Union.
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We began our research with the exploration of the systems of legal remedy, study-
ing these systems in nine EU Member States. National experts answered our ques-
tions (see the interview guide in Annex 1). Following the interview template was 
obligatory for all the interviewees in order to compare their answers. The experts 
were asked to answer all nine questions and to seek typical legal cases and national 
examples. The experts were lawyers, who were selected primarily because of their 
knowledge of the legal background. Our intention was to cover as much as possible of 
the European Union in order to discover different characteristics of different regions. 
In every case, there were experts involved in public procurement who were person-
ally interviewed following the completion of our interview template. The countries 
under study included Austria, Germany, France, Finland, Sweden, Poland, Romania, 
Italy, and Hungary.
Based on the experts’ answers, we group the countries and summarize for each 
group how compliance risk combats innovativeness based on national practices. The 
experts presented the characteristics of the systems for legal remedy on the basis of 
which we can draw our conclusions using a measurement system and identify the 
criteria that influence the non-compliance decisions of public purchasers.
4. National remedy systems and their characteristics
The literature review revealed that only a few research addresses the types and 
forms of non-compliant purchasing behaviour. However, a number of papers refer to 
how the knowledge and complexity of procurement processes may effect compliance 
of activities.
Having become acquainted with the systems and procedures of legal remedy, we 
distinguished four important types of non-compliance leading to the assumption of 
higher risks on the part of the public purchaser:
1. Capability of the remedy system to comprehend procurement problems;
2. The fee and other costs of the remedy procedure;
3. Length and efficiency of the remedy procedure;
4. Other characteristics of procedural law.
The types of non-compliance were determined based on the logic of individual na-
tional remedy systems. The interview template aimed to discover the characteristics 
of national remedy systems. The answers of the interviewees highlighted the most 
important reasons of non-compliance in their specific country. The nine topics of the 
interview template allowed us to organize the opinions around the four dimensions. 
Next to the first three topics (capability, cost, efficiency), the fourth dimension flexi-
bly involved other experiences of national experts.
Behind the four dimensions there was the underlying assumption that if the pub-
lic purchaser believes that there is no real danger of legal remedy, he will be bold to 
make attempts to deviate from the rules. Such a deviation does not always mean an 
innovative idea; it may naturally mean an expressly malevolent initiative to constrain 
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competition. In this case we assume that the public purchaser has an interest in con-
ducting competition in as wide a range as possible, and that she/he is authorised to 
take more initiatives due to professional reasons for public procurement and to bold-
ly apply the innovative solutions enabled by legal regulations. 
In the case of the nine EU Member States under study, we compare from what 
point of view is the court forum procurement specific. The majority opted for the 
standard court solution; in a few cases a mixed model is being built. It is perceptible 
that few Member States chose the standard route of civil law. 
Table 1: Organisation responsible for the remedy decision of the first instance in the remedy system













 Austria and France have administrative courts; in Germany there are the Cham-
bers of Public Procurement Review, which are bodies similar to courts but are not 
courts themselves. In Finland, legal disputes are taken to the Market Court, which is a 
specialised court. In Sweden, the competition authority can be regarded as an admin-
istrative body in the sense that it does not adjudge, it only supervises. The competi-
tion authority may refer cases to the administrative courts only if they find the con-
tracting authorities to be in violation of the rules of public procurement for impos-
ing fines. The Swedish competition authority is a public authority, which safeguards 
competition, intensifies it and supervises public procurement in Sweden, focusing on 
the illegal direct awarding of contracts. In Poland, the body of the first instance is the 
National Appeals Chamber, which is a special body with an administrative nature set 
up by the Act on Public Procurement with exclusive powers to hear the legal disputes 
between economic actors and the competent authorities in the first instance and to 
make decisions. In Italy, the administrative court decides on issues of public procure-
ment. In the majority of the cases under study, a court or a court-like organisation 
takes action in the first instance; in a lesser number of cases an administrative agency 
makes the decision.
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Table 2: Payment of fees upon the commencement of the remedy procedure,








Romania NCSC; x court
Italy ANAC; x court
Hungary x
Source: Authors
In the majority of the Member States under study, the legal remedy is initiated for 
a fee. The form in which the party winning the litigation is compensated as a result 
varies, if, for instance, a party lost the opportunity to perform. Since the decision of 
the European Court of Justice brought in the joint cases of SC Star Storage and Others 
v. Institutul Național de Cercetare-Dezvoltare în Informatică (C439/14 and C488/14) 
it is no longer disputed that the existence of an administrative service fee is in line 
with the directives. This, however, does not mean that the amount of the fee could be 
determined freely, independently of market conditions and the capability of market 
actors to bear costs. 
In Austria, remedy fees have to be paid on the review applications (Nachprüfungs-
antrag) and fact-finding applications (Feststellungsantrag). The amount depends on 
the value of the contract and some other factors, such as the type of the procurement 
procedure or the type of the contract, etc. According to the rules on fees for public 
procurement of the Federal Administrative Court, fees between EUR 500-6,156 have 
to be paid to initiate the procedure.
In Germany, the amount of the fee is generally based on the value of the contract 
to be awarded. The minimum fee is EUR 2,500. The fee may not exceed EUR 50,000. In 
individual cases, if extraordinary efforts are required or the economic importance of 
the contract is particularly great, the fee m ay be raised up to EUR 100,000.
In France and in Sweden, no fees are required to be paid to initiate legal remedy.
In Finland, the basic remedy fee in the case of legal disputes concerning public 
procurement is EUR 2,000 (except for private individuals, whose fee is EUR 500). If 
the value of the awarded contract reaches EUR 1,000,000, the remedy fee rises to EUR 
4,000. If the value of the awarded contract is at least EUR 10,000,000, the remedy fee 
increases to EUR 6,000. 
In Poland, the fee for any appeal submitted to the National Appeals Chamber 
(body of the first instance) varies depending on the value of the public procurement 
contract. In the case of values below the EU threshold the fee is PLN 7,500 (approx. 
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EUR 1,744) in the case of the procurement of goods and services, and PLN 10,000 (ap-
prox. EUR 2,325) in the case of works contracts, while in the cases of contracts at or 
above the EU threshold the fee is PLN 15,000 (approx. EUR 3,488) for the procurement 
of goods and services, and PLN 20,000 (approx. EUR 4,651) for works contracts. In the 
case of a review, this value may increase up to PLN 100,000 (EUR 23,256).
 In Romania, the procedure in front of the National Council for the Solving of 
Complaints (NCSC) is free of charge. This is one of the main reasons why most bid-
ders turn to the NSCS with their complaints and not to the court. If, however, their 
first choice was the court, they would have to pay certain fees. The concrete value of 
the individual levy is determined based on an appropriate algorithm; the fee amounts 
to 2% of the value of the (estimated) value of the contract of the complaint but this 
rate is reduced from a certain value.
In Italy, the regional administrative court charges a fee of EUR 2,000-6,000, while 
the State Council charges a fee of EUR 3,000-9,000. In view of the fact that the court 
fee in the case of a simple complaint is EUR 650, it is obvious that in the case of low 
value contracts, economic actors prefer to turn to other types of legal remedy, such as 
out of court procedure in front of the anti-corruption authority.
In Hungary, the amount of the fee depends on the number of elements in the ap-
plication and is 1 to 2% of the estimated value or the contract value.
The application of a public procurement fine is not at all widespread. According to 
Recital (14) and Articles 2d) and 2e) of Directive 2007/66/EC, invalidity is the most ef-
ficient mode of re-establishing competition and opening new business opportunities 
for those who were deprived of their opportunity to compete contrary to the law. An 
alternative to this is imposing fines or restricting the period of the contract, of which 
individual Member States decide on an ad hoc basis. The 2017 Report of the European 
Commission on the Remedies Directives (Directives 89/665/EEC and 92/13/EEC) also 
states that ‘for alternative penalties, the majority of Member States transposed both 
fines and the shortening of the duration of the contracts (...) (European Commission, 
2017). In particular, Member States consider that fines constitute a mere relocation of 
funds.’ In Austria and Poland, fines are charged only exceptionally, in Germany only 
in cartel cases, in Finland fines are exceptional, in France the administrative court im-
poses fines relatively frequently, while in Sweden they are applied in about 10% of the 
cases; in Romania, only a court may impose a fine as an alternative to the annulment 
of certain decisions of the procedure hence it is fairly rarely applied. In Hungary, 
the success of the remedy forum is measured specifically by the revenue from fines, 
which should be as high as possible.
In Austria, the parties usually accept the decisions of the review bodies of the first 
instance, i.e. those of the administrative courts, and submit a complaint (to the Con-
stitutional Court) or a review application (Appeals Administrative Court) in very few 
cases only, although the procedural and financial burden of such appeals are relative-
ly low. From the viewpoint of the efficiency and functionality of the review system 
in public procurement, it is highly important that decisions are made very quickly. 
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Table 3: The average duration of the remedy procedure in the first instance
and the efficiency of legal remedy based on experience
 Duration of the remedy procedure in the fi rst instance
Austria 42 days in case of a review application
Germany 2-8.6 months depending on the chamber
France Urgent: 21 days to 80 days, normal: 6.13 months







 In Germany, the review chamber examines the facts of the case ex officio. This 
differs from a civil court procedure. Here the principle of verification has to be ap-
plied. This means that the burden of proof is on the bidder, who has to provide an 
explanation. The cases below the EU threshold are particularly problematic, because 
the claimant bidder has to substantiate the alleged violation of the contract and it has 
to submit the necessary evidence. All in all, the review system for public procurement 
below the value limit is not particularly efficient, because the little legal remedy avail-
able has substantial disadvantages relative to the legal protection offered above the 
value limit. The statistics on Germany indicate that in 50% of the cases the deadline 
for the court to close review procedures in public procurement as required by law had 
to be extended over the past three years.
In France, legal remedy prior to the conclusion of the contract is fairly efficient 
in the case of the formalised procedures (invitation to tender, competitive dialogue, 
negotiated competitive procedure, etc.). The decision of the French Conseil d’Etat 
brought in the SMIRGEOMES case rationalised and restricted this procedure: the vi-
olation of the procedural rules, if it does not impact the position of the bidder in the 
competition, does not lead to the annulment of the procedure, which is important 
because there are many minor procedural mistakes, which have no impact on the 
essence of the selection process.
In Finland, the remedy system for public procurement is rather effective. The 
Market Court and the judges of the Supreme Administrative Court possess a wealth 
of knowledge on public procurement cases. The courts frequently follow the earlier 
decisions and precedents of the Supreme Administrative Court. Thus, the decision is 
foreseeable in similar cases. The decisions contain thorough justification, which pre-
vents ungrounded complaints from being submitted. The remedy system is, however, 
somewhat slow.
Sweden has not specified any due dates for administrative courts to deal with 
cases, but the courts generally give priority to appeals submitted in public procure-
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ment cases. As a result of the legal regulations concerning public procurement fines, 
the Swedish competition authority carried out a follow-up study in 2015 to see what 
happened at the contracting authorities obligated to pay a public procurement fine. 
The results of the follow-up study were presented in the report Fem år med upp-
handlingsskadeavgift [Five years of public procurement fines]. The report reveals that 
nine of the ten contracting authorities obligated to pay a public procurement fine 
introduced changes in their organisations, for instance they altered their working 
methods, the distribution of work or their procurement practices. In two-thirds of 
the cases the changes were implemented in part or in full as a result of the court de-
cision on imposing the public procurement fine. Almost nine of the ten contracting 
authorities implementing changes as a result of the decision consider the changes to 
be positive. Thus, the national experience on public procurement fines was that they 
did have an impact.
The Polish remedy system in public procurement is one of the fastest in the Euro-
pean Union as the duration of the procedure is 15 days from submitting the complaint 
to the National Appeals Chamber to the day of making the decision. The procedure is 
very fast, at the same time very complicated in the first instance.
In Romania, the members of the review body (NSCS) are independent experts 
selected fundamentally based on merit and they only evaluate cases related to the 
awarding procedure of public procurement contracts, in most cases their decisions 
are just, excellently justified as the vast majority of them are confirmed by the ap-
peals courts. A disadvantage of the system is that because of the mandatory nature 
of the relevant procedural due dates and the penalties that may accompany them, 
sometimes the arbitrators and the judges bring their decisions rather hastily without 
thoroughly considering the situation presented to them. 
In Italy, the higher the value of the contract, the higher the proportion of those 
who submit petitions for protection. At these levels, the amount of the uniform con-
tribution and the costs of litigation lose their usual deterrent effect. In the case of 
high value procurements, the share of contract suspensions relative to the number of 
injunctions issued in the course of the interim measures is substantially lower than 
the average. 
In Hungary, the efficiency of the remedy system is characteristically measured 
by the speed of decision-making, which averaged 26 days in 2017. Following the in-
troduction of the administrative service fee and in parallel with the decline in the 
willingness to seek legal remedy, the controlling activity of the public procurement 
authority was gradually built up inducing additional legal cases under the procedures 
launched ex officio. The number of procedures declined, while the share of ex officio 
procedures increased. In this way, it is rather cumbersome to measure the efficiency 
and genuine added value of the system. The increase in fine revenues cannot be re-
garded as an indicator of the efficiency of the remedy system in European practice.
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Austria - x x x -
Germany x x - x -
France - x x - -
Finland - x - - -
Sweden - - x -
Poland - x x - -
Romania - x x - -
Italy x x x - x
Hungary x x x x x
Source: Authors
With the exception of Hungary and Italy, the other Member States typically do not 
have formal procedures for the unification of the positions taken by individual courts. 
In Germany, there is a regulation according to which if any of the supreme courts of 
any Land wishes to deviate from the decision of another supreme court, then it will 
submit its resolution in the form of a so-called deviation proposal to the Federal Court 
in Karlsruhe.
In Austria, Germany and Poland, it is mandatory to have hearings with limited 
exceptions. In France, it is possible in principle to make a decision without a hearing, 
but that is very rare. In contrast, in Finland oral hearings are very rare, the decisions 
of the Market Court are usually based on written documentation. In Sweden, the 
decision depends on the initiator, hence hearings are held in the majority of cases. 
In Romania, hearings are held depending on the decision of NSCS, where the parties 
may submit written conclusions in any phase of the procedure and at times may 
request permission to present their arguments orally. In Italy, hearings are held and 
prior to the decision, the parties may submit documents (evidence) and memos prior 
to the hearing at the administrative court. In Hungary, the significance of the hearing 
is declining but upon request the remedy forum characteristically does have hearings, 
except for certain cases. All in all, hearings are held in the majority of the Member 
States under study, but it is frequent that decisions are made without a hearing in 
France and Finland, and the situation varies in Sweden and Romania. Legislators are 
primarily guided by aspects of efficiency in subjecting hearings to conditions.
In Austria, the Federal Administrative Court may bring its decisions only within 
the limits of the elements of the petition, but the court is not required to justify the 
petition. In Germany, the decision-making powers of the Public Procurement Review 
Chamber serves the protection of the rights of the bidders and it is not under an obli-
gation to carry out comprehensive, general compliance examinations, but it may con-
duct additional investigations. In France, Poland and Italy, decision-making is bound 
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by the petition. In Finland, the appeals authority may acquire evidence upon its own 
initiative, the remedy fora are not restricted insofar as to examine only evidence 
submitted by the parties; this, however, does not mean an unlimited right to extend 
the complaint. In Sweden, the remedy forum is authorised to extend the complaint 
without restrictions and to acquire additional evidence. In Romania, the decision is 
bound by the petition, but if the review body finds in the course of the procedure ap-
propriate to the given complaint that there were additional irregularities beside the 
violation constituting the subject of the complaint, it must notify the national public 
procurement authority and, eventually, also the Audit Office. In Hungary, the reme-
dy forum may extend the subject of the investigation in the course of the procedure. 
The possibility of the extension is not widespread, but it is an applied solution in 
Germany and Finland, and this is the main rule in Sweden; it can also be initiated in 
Romania. In other words, several legislators have addressed this possibility.
As a main rule in Austria, the decisions of the administrative courts are brought 
by a single judge, but the law allows decision-making in ‘senates’. The senate consists 
of three members, a chairman and two lay members, having special expertise in pub-
lic procurement. The lay judges must have experience obtained either at contracting 
authorities or economic actors. In Germany, the public procurement review chamber 
consists of a chairman, a full-time and volunteer member (juror), who need not be a 
lawyer. In France, the procedure in the first instance is conducted in front of a single 
judge as in the case of every administrative or emergency procedure conducted in 
front of a civil court. 
In Finland, the Market Court has a quorum, if three of its members having qualifi-
cations in law are present. In Sweden, the general rule applicable to the administrative 
court is that a judge with legal qualifications and three lay judges adjudge the cases. 
In Poland, appeals are generally examined by the acting court council of the National 
Appeals Chamber consisting of a single member, except for situations when a court 
council consisting of three members examines the case because of its complexity, or 
because of its nature as a precedent. In Romania, complaints submitted to NSCS are 
evaluated by a panel consisting of three members, while complaints submitted to the 
tribunal are adjudged by a single judge. The members of NSCS are not judges per se, 
but civil servants operating in accordance with a special order, who must be experts 
having degrees either in economics or law. In Italy, the court consists of three admin-
istrative judges. In Hungary, decisions are made within a council consisting of three 
members, in which the role of the lay member as a professional commissioner having 
experience in the subject of procurement is important. The number of the members 
of the acting council is characteristically more than one. The lay member without a 
degree in law is frequent in the remedy cases in public procurement. Criticisms in the 
Member States frequently refer to the lack of involving experts. Where the remedy 
procedure is very fast, the involvement of experts is usually omitted. 
Mandatory representation is less characteristic, particularly in the first instance. 
Representation is definitely understood as representation of a legal nature, particu-
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larly when representation is in front of a court. The issue does not arise sharply, be-
cause if the complexity of the regulatory environment requires it, the parties tend to 
appear with a representative. Specialised independent expert or legal representation 
is mandatory in Hungary and Italy. 
To conclude our analysis in terms of the four dimensions of our research model, 
the following results can be formulated. 
When comparing the nine countries the institutional backgrounds are different. In 
most of the cases a court or a court-like organisation takes action in the first instance; 
in a lesser number of cases an administrative agency makes the decision. The results 
show that the first instance bodies are typically not specialized in public procurement 
which does not increase trust based on professional knowledge sharing.
The remedy fee is widely accepted in the analysed EU countries, which affects the 
remedy activity mainly for SMEs.
The length of remedy procedures is quite high in three of the investigated coun-
tries (more than 2 months), but around 1 month in 3 countries. The problem is that 
the procedure itself postpones the whole public procurement procedure which affects 
the date of signing the contract and the execution phase as well. The direct effect of 
the length of the remedy procedure inevitably emerges and postpones several deci-
sions of procurement and, therefore, might increase the probability of losing money 
in EU-funded projects because it suspends the procurement procedure for 1-9 months 
depending on the country’s system.
The additional characteristics show that having a hearing is part of the proce-
dure which offers an opportunity to stakeholders to communicate and share their 
thoughts within the procedure. But the role of a lay element or the mandatory legal 
representation is not typical and the uniform decisions in the remedy systems are 
not widespread either. These additional elements do not support the applicant when 
starting a compliance procedure.
Based on the results presented above, we distinguished two characteristic groups 
of countries using a measurement system: 
 – The professional dimension is given 1 point per country if an independent au-
thority – a body with a better understanding of special public procurement – is 
responsible for remedy. 
 – The second dimension represents the time consumption of the process. 1 point is 
given per country if the procedure takes 1 month or less. 
 – The third dimension of the categorization is determined by the fee of legal reme-
dy. If there is no fee on legal remedies, the system of enforcement of interests is 
more accessible, then the given country received 1 point. 
 – The fourth dimension evaluates other specificities characterising remedy pro-
cedures linked to the professional aspects of procurement. If most of the listed 
specificities are met, the country receives 1 point. If less than 3 of the specificities 
are met, the country receives none. 
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Summarizing country performances in all dimensions, we found that compliance 
criteria are best enforced by Germany, Poland, Romania, Italy and Hungary for the 
four dimensions, while it is less enforced by Austria, France, Finland and Sweden.
Table 5: Comparing the results based on the four dimensions
  1st dimension 2nd dimension 3rd dimension 4th dimension Total
Austria 0 0 0 1 1
Germany 1 0 0 1 2
France 0 1 0 0 1
Finland 0 0 0 0 0
Sweden 0 1 0 0 1
Poland 1 0 1 0 2
Romania 1 1 0 0 2
Italy 0 1 0 1 2
Hungary 1 0 0 1 2
Source: Authors
Based on the findings above, it is important to conclude that if the system of public 
procurement organizations is developed and if the legally supported enforcement of 
the interests of compliance is traditionally embedded in public procurement, then the 
longer procedure or the more expensive legal remedy is not necessarily an obstacle. 
However, in the context of Central and Eastern Europe, where the history of public 
procurement is shorter and the risk of corruption is typically higher, conditions such 
as affordability, professionalism, speed – which are also considered important by the 
states concerned – are much more important. The distinction between the two groups 
does not cover a qualitative difference but rather sets different priorities when remedy 
systems are developed, maintained and evaluated by the respective Member States.
5. Summary
Public policy preferences are deeply interwoven with public procurements al-
though they occasionally add up to internal contradictions that mutually degrade each 
other because of their antagonistic character such as accountability and low prices, 
innovativeness and established references, SME-friendliness and the quest for quality, 
etc. (Gellén, 2016). In the case of compliance policy within public procurements the 
preferences are somewhat contradicting as well: there is an obvious motivation for 
quick and smooth public procurement proceedings with the expectation that a fair 
competition would promote low prices and high quality. On the other hand, compli-
ance issues inevitably absorb costs, time and energy that do not contribute to the con-
tent of the project, adding even the risk of partly or fully losing project funding. Such 
contradictions are treated by policy makes by imposing high fees or applying other 
bureaucratic barriers to filter out as many legal remedy seekers as possible.
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In the course of our study, we explored the characteristics which influence the de-
cision of the applicant economic actors initiating a remedy procedure. We concluded 
that if the activities of the remedy fora are credible, then their decisions are known in 
a wide range and are accepted by the initiators, who tend to trust them. If the courts 
frequently approve the decisions of the contracting authorities, this does not encour-
age economic actors to turn to the court. 
For market actors, beside the criteria of a creditworthy set of organisations, de-
cision-makers with expertise and genuine sanctions, a good relationship with the 
contracting authority or a fear of not welcoming their bids in public procurement 
subsequently constitute important aspects. If, however, it is rare to have a lay mem-
ber with expertise in the subject of procurement in the remedy system, or no hear-
ings are held, or only the content of a given petition may be the basis of remedy, this 
influences the willingness to initiate the procedure. As resolutions for uniformity are 
rarely formalised, this is not really a criterion in well-functioning remedy systems. 
While the assessment of remedy fees and fines is mixed, they certainly have a 
deterrent force. As the majority does not require the presence of an attorney-at-law, 
at most it can be stated that the presence of an attorney-at-law or an expert with 
knowledge of the European legal cases is recommended on account of the complicat-
ed procedural rules, which, however, greatly increases costs.
As the procedure is very long in many cases, which may give rise to substan-
tial costs, the slowness of the procedures is one of the most important deterrents 
in the market. It is of primary importance for economic actors to have a decision, 
which is professionally substantiated at not too high costs with as little in terms 
of negative consequences as possible and within some foreseeable time. If any of 
these conditions do not exist, bidders tend not to opt for the enforcement of their 
rights. As there is a low number of European legal cases applicable to innovative 
solutions, there are even less cases on the appropriate remedy experience. Thus, 
the willingness to litigate is actually influenced by the risks posed by the remedy 
system. Accordingly, and indirectly, green evaluation criteria or preference given to 
fair trade products carry at least as much risk as choosing the new procedural type 
of the innovation partnership. Confronted with a shortage of lay members and a 
shortage of remedy experience, the remedy fora are unable to react flexibly, which 
in itself leads to an increase in the risk of fines and other sanctions as a result of the 
remedy procedure. A remedy system specialised in public procurement is in vain, if 
the contracting authority intends to introduce some kind of novelty. If innovative-
ness strains the flexibility of the remedy forum, even the experienced contracting 
authorities do not dare to be innovative, because they are worried about the risks of 
their decision. In addition to the penalty, the risk to the supplies arising as a result 
of an extended procedure, or the risk to their reputation all have an impact on the 
restrained behaviour of the contracting authorities. Contracting authorities tend to 
wait and see rather than be the first to test a Dynamic Procurement System. Accord-
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ingly, the types of non-compliance include:
 – absence of trust in the preparedness and reliability of the organisations;
 – fear of a costly procedure; 
 – fear of an exceedingly lengthy and less efficient procedure;
 – uncertainty related to matters that concern the possibilities of the initiator in the 
course of the procedure (such as the extension of elements of the original peti-
tion or the absence of hearings). 
Based on the above, a procurement-friendly set of institutions must be well pre-
pared, have experience, and be reliable, efficient, cheap and flexible. Short of these, 
the willingness to initiate innovative solutions declines and economic actors tend to 
enforce their interests less.
Additional more detailed studies should go into what sort of an impact all these 
have on their innovativeness and under what conditions contracting authorities 
would be willing to take the initiative more and to enforce their interests better. It 
would be important to learn what an ideal procurement-conform remedy system and 
procedures in public procurement would be like, which would encourage innovative-
ness of contracting authorities and also of the bidders.
This article summarised existing models and enables decision makers to view the 
reasons of non-compliant processes in a systemic perspective. The reasons and pro-
moting factors of non-compliance ought to be handled together in a single logical 
framework instead of evaluating EU Member States’ practices only in the context of 
their particular public procurement culture.
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Annex 1.
Interview template of the comparative study
to be followed by the national experts
1. Institutional system and independence of public procurement remedies, connection 
of other institutional system actors with the remedy forum.
2. Public procurement remedy fees, costs, possible opinions on the necessity and con-
sequences of the remedy fee.
3. Data on public procurement remedies for the last 5 years, if available:
a) what entities can start the remedy process ex officio, the number of initiated proce-
dures;
b) the number of procedures initiated by applicants;
c) the number of cases where the contracting authority’s decision was annulled, in 
what proportion of the cases was a fine imposed;
d) in what typical cases were fines imposed and the amount of fines imposed typically.
4. Important elements of the procedural rules of appeal – deadlines in particular:
a) Is there a hearing or the decision of the appeal body is based only on the written 
files?
b) How long/ until what stage of the procedure can the parties submit evidence?
c) Does the remedy forum have the right of extension of the plaint, can the remedy 
forum examine a question that was not included in the appeal?
d) What procedural deadlines apply? Is there a distinction between certain types of 
cases and the procedural deadlines applicable for them?
e) Is there a public trial between legally equal parties?
f) How many members does the acting council consist o? Do you have a lay element, 
if yes are they involved in the investigation and do they deal with legal remedies?
g) Is the judicial remedy forum more like a public administration body or rather like a 
judicial court?
h) Is there mandatory representation by a registered lawyer in the appeal or in the 
hearing?
i) Is there a remedy (right of appeal, review right, etc.) against the decision of the 1st 
instance review body?
5. Transparency of the decisions of the remedy forum(s).
6. The role of unitary decisions of a judicial remedy forum, if any.
7. Effectiveness and functionality of the remedy system.
8. The remedies in connection with the fulfillment of public contracts, in particular 
regarding the following issues:
a) Can a review body investigate the fulfillment of the contract?
b) Can a review forum investigate the modification of the contract?
c) Can a review body examine whether contractual sanctions are enforced by the con-
tracting entity in the case of breaching the contract?
d) Can the review forum investigate the validity of public contracts and contract 
amendments, if so, what legal consequences can they impose?
9. National experiences, good and bad practices in the remedy system.
